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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
SALES
David W. Robertson*
Whether a given agreement constitutes a sale or some other
kind of transaction will often have bearing upon the proper
manner and amount of relief, as well as upon such matters as
prescription. For example, if a contractor agrees to furnish
materials and to install them in a house or building, it is perti-
nent to decide whether the contract constitutes a building con-
tract or a sale, because of questions of risk, relief, and prescrip-
tion. The jurisprudence has developed a test for distinguishing
between a contract of undertaking and a sale, based upon a
comparison of the relative value of the thing as opposed to the
work involved in installing it.' In Brown v. Sanders2 plaintiff
had contracted to install a heating system in defendant's house.
Installation was almost complete when the house was destroyed
by fire. The court was initially confronted with the problem
whether the contract in question was a sale or a contract of
undertaking. If the contract was a sale, article 24673 would
place the risk of loss on the buyer, whereas under article 27584
the undertaker would bear the risk of loss prior to the delivery
of the thing.5 The court held that it was immaterial whether
the transaction was a sale or a construction contract, because
the defendant had accepted the system as installed and had
acknowledged liability for it. There are some indications in the
language of the opinion that the court felt the contract was prob-
ably a contract of undertaking rather than a sale, but its dis-
position of the case rendered decision of that issue unnecessary.
In Beatty v. Vining," it became necessary for the court to
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See Mangin v. Jorgens, 24 So. 2d 384 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1946) ; Dugue
v. Safety Oil Burners, 142 So. 161 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
2. 149 So.2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
3. LA. Civw CODE art. 2467 (1870) : "As soon as the contract of sale is
completed, the thing sold is at the risk of the buyer, but with the following modi-
fications."
4. Id. art. 2758 (1870): "When the undertaker furnishes the materials for
the work, if the work be destroyed, in whatever manner it may happen, previous
to its being delivered to the owner, the loss shall be sustained by the undertaker,
unless the proprietor be in default for not receiving it, though duly notified to
do so."
5. See Hunt v. Suares, 9 La. 434 (1836).
6. 147 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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decide whether the transactions in question were sales or acts
of partition because of a difference in the law with regard to
the action of rescission for lesion. If the transactions in ques-
tion were found to be sales, the action of rescission for lesion
would not lie, because movable property as well as immovable
property was involved.7 The court concluded that the transac-
tions in question were partitions, and that they could be rescind-
ed under article 18618 despite the fact that both movables and
immovables were involved. The court stated:
"The transaction between plaintiff and defendant in the in-
stant case can be characterized only as an act of partition.
Regardless of the form of an act, the rule is well established
in the jurisprudence that every first settlement between
heirs or partners of which a state of indivision is terminated
is, in substance, a partition, even though the instruments
have the form and appearance of sales."9
Just as it is often important to distinguish a sale from some
other kind of contract, it is also sometimes necessary to decide
when a sale has been consummated, or, putting the question an-
other way, whether a particular contract is a contract to sell as
opposed to a completed sale. In Plaquemines Equi'pment &
Machinery Co. v. Ford Motor Co.10 plaintiff had ordered a spe-
cially built truck from a motor company in New Orleans and
had paid a deposit on the agreed purchase price. It was agreed
that the balance of the price would be liquidated at the time of
delivery of the completed truck. While the cab and chassis of
the truck were in possession of the motor company prior to the
special installations, they were seized by the local distributor, a
creditor of the motor company. Plaintiff contended that the
7. LA. CiviL CoDn art. 2594 (1870): "Rescission for lesion beyond moiety
is not granted against sales of movables and produce, nor when rights to a suc-
cession have been sold to a stranger, nor in matter of transfer of credits, nor
against sales of immovable property made by virtue of any decree or process of
a court justice."
8. Id. art. 1861 (1870): "The law, however, will not release a person of
full age, and who is under no incapacity, against the effect of his voluntary
contracts, on account of such implied error or imposition, except in the two fol-
lowing cases:
"1. In partition where there is a difference in the value of the portions
to more than the amount of one-fourth to the prejudice of one or [of] the
parties;
"2. In sales of immovable property, the vendor may be relieved, if the
price given is less than one-half of the value of the thing sold; but the sale
can not be invalidated for lesion to the injury of the purchaser."
9. 147 So. 2d at 41.
10. 148 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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sale was complete by virtue of articles 2439 and 2456 of the Civil
Code," whereas the distributor argued that ownership had never
vested in the plaintiff and that his seizure was proper. The
court of appeal concluded, agreeing with the trial court, that
because the thing which the motor company had agreed to sell
to the plaintiff had never come into existence- that is, a spe-
cially equipped truck - no sale had been completed, and that
the seizure by the distributor was valid.
Article 2480 of the Civil Code provides: "In all cases where
the thing sold remains in the possession of the seller, because
he has reserved to himself the usufruct, or retains possession by
a precarious title, there is reason to presume that the sale is
simulated, and with respect to third persons, the parties must
produce proof that they are acting in good faith, and establish
the reality of the sale." In Wilson v. Moore12 plaintiff-vendor
brought suit against defendant-vendee contending that a sale of
record of real property was actually a simulation, and was also
void for fraud. The court held for the defendant, primarily be-
cause it did not believe the plaintiff's witnesses or his testimony
on the facts. It was stated that the article 2480 presumption
does not apply as between the parties, but arises only in cases
where third persons are involved in the matter. This interpre-
tation of article 2480 would appear consistent with the prior
jurisprudence, as well as with the purpose of that provision. 3
In Brumfield v. Paul4 plaintiff sought to annul a sale of
land made by her to the defendant on the ground that she was
at the time of the sale under sedation and therefore incapable
of contracting. She also argued that she had received no part
of the purchase price. Defendant's principal argument was that
the authentic act of sale was susceptible of attack as between
the parties only by means of a counter letter or interrogatories,
or by alleging fraud or error. The court stated that although the
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2439 (1870) : "The contract of sale is an agreement
by which one gives a thing for a price in current money, and the other gives the
price in order to have the thing itself.
"Three circumstances concur to the perfection of the contract, to-wit:
the thing sold, the price and the consent."
Art. 2456: "The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties, and
the property is of right acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as
soon as there exists an agreement for the object and for the price thereof, al-
though the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid."
12. 146 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
13. See Lemann, Some Aspects of Simulation in France and Louisiana, 29
TUL. L. REV. 22 (1954).
14. 145 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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defendant's theory of law was correct, in the instant situation
parol evidence was admissible because of the allegations of plain-
tiff's petition pertaining to her capacity to contract. The court
stated that the allegations of the petition were pertinent to the
ability of plaintiff to give consent, rather than to any facts
which might vitiate consent legally given.
Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Hebert15 was a concursus proceeding
wherein plaintiff sought to have itself declared the owner of
royalty payments which had accrued from two gas production
units. The ownership of the funds depended upon a determina-
tion of the ownership of strips of property underlying a canal
and a public road. Plaintiff's contention was that in a sale of
the property encompassing the canal and public road the lan-
guage "less right of way for canal and public road on the west
and south side" meant that the fee title to the land stated in
that reservation was preserved by the vendor. The court con-
cluded that the language did not reserve title to the land, but
merely amounted to a reservation of a servitude for canal and
road purposes. The court laid stress upon the fact that the di-
mensions of the right of way reportedly reserved in the sale
were not given in the deed, and stated that the "use of the term
'right of way' usually indicates that only a servitude or a right
of passage is being conveyed or reserved, and . . . it should be
construed as meaning only a servitude unless the instrument,
considered as a whole, indicates that the parties intended for
it to mean the fee title."' 6
The case of Trumbull Chevrolet Sales Co. v. Maxwell'7 dealt
with the effect of the purchaser's giving a worthless check in
payment upon passage of title to an automobile; it has been dis-
cussed in another issue of this Review.'5
Article 2652 of the Civil Code allows a litigant against whom
a right in litigation has been transferred to terminate the liti-
gation by paying to the transferee of the right the real price
of the transfer together with interest. 9 The party seeking to
exercise the right of litigious redemption must do so timely; he
cannot wait to see what the outcome of the litigation may be be-
15. 146 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
16.. Id. at 532.
17. 142 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
18. See Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 138 (1962).
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2652 (1870) : "He against whom a litigious right has
been transferred, may get himself released by paying to the transferee the real
price of the transfer, together with the interest from its date."
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fore seeking to avail himself of the right. In A. N. & J. Solari,
Ltd. v. Fitzgerald2 O the court concluded that the defendant's at-
tempted exercise of the right of litigious redemption was not
timely. It was found that the defendant had had knowledge of
the assignment of the claim for at least eleven months prior to
trial, and thereafter tried the case to conclusion before seeking
to avail himself of the provisions of article 2652.
It is apparently fairly well-settled that an unrecorded judg-
ment of divorce will not affect the rights of a third person who
deals with the husband with regard to community real prop-
erty.21 In Speights v. Nance22 the wife sought to pursue her
rights as a creditor of the community against a vendee from her
divorced husband of his one-half interest in the community. The
court concluded that as the rights of the wife against the com-
munity property were not recorded in the conveyance records,
the judgment of divorce and the rights flowing therefrom were
void as to the property acquired from the husband.
Redhibition and Quanti Minoris
Most of the cases decided during this perod were actions for
rescission of a sale or for reduction of the purchase price be-
cause of redhibitory vices or defects. The usual approach as
to the proper measure of recovery in an action quanti minoris
has been to award the purchaser by way of reduction of the
purchase price an amount equal to the difference between
the value of the thing as warranted and its value as sold in its
defective condition. It has been pointed out that in the situa-
tion where the purchase price of the thing was something less
than its real value, the purchaser is placed in a better position
by being successful in an action quanti minoris than by securing
the return of the entire purchase price in a redhibitory action.23
It has been suggested that this anomaly could be avoided in such
a situation by taking the price paid as the ultimate value of the
thing rather than its value as warranted.
24
In Pursell v. Kelly25 a different approach to this problem
was suggested. In that case the situation was complicated to an
20. 150 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
21. See Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949).
22. 142 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
23. See Smith, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-59
Term- Sales, 20 LA. L. REv. 226, 230 (1960).
24. Ibid.
25. 244 La. 323, 152 So. 2d 36 (1963).
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extent by the fact that the thing sold was a building. The juris-
prudence has apparently established a rule to the effect that "in
actions for quanti minoris involving the sale of realty, the meas-
ure of recovery is the amount necessary to convert the unsound
structure into a sound one. The reason given for this exception
is that the usual rule - that the measure of the recovery is the
difference between the value of the thing sold in its defective
condition and its value as warranted . . . -cannot be applied
in cases of this sort inasmuch as the difference in value of real
estate is not readily or easily ascertainable unless there has been
an immediate resale of the property. ' 26 The court, confronted
with evidence that it would require $9871.15 to repair a build-
ing worth at the time of the sale $12,000, stated:
"In the event it were held in the instant case that the defend-
ant was liable for a reduction in price, application of the
aforementioned method of measuring recovery would appear
to be highly inequitable, for this would require defendant
to pay the costs, amounting to almost $10,000.00, to repair
a building valued at only $12,000.00 at the time of the sale.
In instances where the cost of the repairs are so far out of
proportion with the price paid for the property, it would
seem that a rescission of the sale would be the only just and
proper remedy, and the vendee has shown that he is able
to place his vendor in substantially the same position as he
was prior to the sale. '27
That the technique of using the amount necessary to effect
the needed repairs as the proper measure of recovery in quanti
minoris actions is applicable only to sales of realty is illustrated
by the case of Delta Equipment & Construction Co. v. Cook.28
The court, after concluding that the sale of a dragline was not
complete in Mississippi because of the intention of the parties
to execute a formal sale with a mortgage, but was complete in
Louisiana, went on to apply the Louisiana law of quanti minoris.
It was urged that the proper measure of recovery should be the
amount necessary to effect the essential repairs. The court re-
fused to adopt that measure of recovery, distinguishing or re-
jecting several court of appeal cases and pointing out that the
Supreme Court has never allowed that measure of recovery ex-
cept in sales of real property. The court stated:
26. 152 So. 2d at 39n. See Lemonier v. Coco, 237 La. 760, 112 So. 2d 436
(1959), discussed at 20 LA. L. Rav. 230-31 (1960).
27. 152 So. 2d at 39-40n.
28. 142 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
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"We believe the soundness of the rule thus established by
the Supreme Court's refusal to use the cost of repairs as the
measure of diminution of price in all redhibitory action cases
is demonstrated by the fact that cost of repair is impossible
of application to vices in irreparable objects, such as un-
sound corn. '2
9
The court then accepted testimony of expert witnesses as to the
difference between the value of the thing as sold and as war-
ranted and applied that difference as the proper measure of
recovery.
In an action for return of the purchase price because of red-
hibitory defects, the law requires the buyer to tender a return of
the object sold except where return is made impossible by reason
of the nature of the thing or by reason of its destruction through
the very defects complained of. Several recent cases bear upon
that obligation on the part of the buyer. In Kennedy v. Jacob-
son-Young, Inc.,30 plaintiff brought a redhibitory action with re-
gard to the sale of an automobile. The seller argued that the
buyer's action in dismantling the engine in his attempt to effect
the necessary repairs rendered the automobile unfit for tender
of return, so that the redhibitory action could not be maintained.
His primary reliance was on the 1952 case of Poor v. Hemen-
way,31 wherein the court had concluded that the buyer's almost
complete dismantling of a yacht had rendered it unfit for a
proper return to the seller. The court in the Kennedy case con-
cluded that Poor v. Hemenway was inapplicable in the instant
situation, by reason of the fact that no such major overhaul had
been undertaken on the automobile in question. It appeared that
all had been done was "to pull the head" from the engine of the
car. The court stated that the facts of the instant case more
nearly resembled those of the case of Madiere v. Sharp,32 where
the buyer's action to rescind the sale of a cabin cruiser by reason
of redhibitory defects was sustained notwithstanding his at-
tempts at some repairs, the court concluding that the repairs
undertaken were only those necessary to insure that the vessel
stay afloat. In the instant case the court concluded that a suffi-
cient tender of return had been made, and granted redhibition
to the buyer. In Davis v. Brown Chevrolet, Inc.,33 the seller con-
29. 142 So. 2d at 440.
30. 244 La. 191, 151 So. 2d 368 (1963).
31. 221 La. 770, 60 So. 2d 310 (1952).
32. 230 La. 723, 89 So. 2d 214 (1956).
33. 148 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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tended that the buyer's tender of return was inadequate because
the vehicle involved had been damaged in an accident. The court
stated that subsequent damage could not alter the fact that the
truck had been unusable at the time of the sale, and that the
seller could be protected by being given full credit for the dam-
age caused by the buyer to the vehicle. In Ziblich v. Metry Up-
holstery, Inc.,3 4 the buyer contended that draperies sold and in-
stalled by the defendant were defective. The court concluded
that they were defective and that a sufficient tender of return
had been made by the purchaser by merely calling the seller on
the telephone and requesting that he send someone to remove
the draperies. The seller's contention was that Civil Code ar-
ticle 252035 requires an actual tender of return. The court stated
that actual tender is ordinarily necessary whenever it is reason-
ably possible to physically tender the return of a defective ar-
ticle, but that the requirement has no application in a situation
where the seller is also the installer of the article purchased.
The implied-in-law warranty against redhibitory vices and
defects, like almost any other provision of law, can be renounced
by the party in whose favor the law imposes it. Two recently
decided cases involved questions of what constitutes a waiver
of this warranty. In Stevens v. Daigle and Hinson Rambler,
Inc.,3 6 the contention of the seller was that plaintiff had waived
his right to bring the redhibitory action by accepting from the
seller a pamphlet entitled "Rambler Owner's Manual," wherein
warranties were made by the manufacturer of the vehicle, and
wherein it was stated: "Your authorized Rambler dealer, inde-
pendently and not as agent of manufacturer or American Motor
Sales Corporation . . . extends to you as purchaser of a new
Rambler a like warranty." The seller's contention was that the
quoted language constituted a waiver of the warranty against
redhibitory defects. In rejecting that argument, the court
stated:
"In our opinion there must be an express waiver or modifi-
cation of the warranty by agreement between the vendor
and vendee. Such agreement cannot be said to have been
made between the parties by the delivery only of a manual
34. 148 So. 2d 436 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
35. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2520 (1870): "Redhibition is the avoidance of a
sale on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders it either
absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be sup-
posed that the buyer would not have purchased it had he known of the vice."
36. 153 So. 2d 511 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
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to purchaser and his acceptance thereof without a meeting
of the minds expressly limiting the warranty. In other
words, the vendor by any act on his part alone may not modi-
fy the warranty implied in all sales in Louisiana but such
warranty can only be changed or modified by express agree-
ment of both parties. '3 7
In Harris v. Automatic Enterprises of Louisiana, Inc.,3 s a red-
hibitory action was brought seeking rescission of the sale of
laundry equipment. The seller's defense was that the defects
were minor, and that there was a printed warranty on the in-
voice which excluded all other warranties. It appeared that
language on the back of the invoice did waive the warranty
against redhibitory vices and defects. The court refused to give
effect to that waiver, stating that such a stipulation can have
no effect against a buyer unless called to his attention. This
result is of course consistent with the general rule that the fine
print on the back of a receipt or invoice will not bind an unwary
party to the transaction.
In an action in redhibition, if the seller had no knowledge of
the defect in question, the buyer can recover only the purchase
price and the expenses occasioned by the sale.39 On the other
hand, if the buyer had knowledge of the defect, damages can
also be awarded. 40 The jurisprudence has evolved a rule that
knowledge of the defective qualities in a thing sold is to be im-
puted to the manufacturer thereof, thereby justifying an award
of damages against him. 41 However, thus far the courts have
refused to impute such knowledge to a seller who is not also the
manufacturer of the article, unless the seller has labelled the
goods as his own or has in some way held them out to be manu-
factured by him. In Samaha v. Southern Rambler Sales, Inc., 42
the purchased automobile had a defective seat bracket which
37. Id. at 514.
38. 145 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
39. LA. CIVm CODE art. 2531 (1870): "The seller who knew not the vices
of the thing is only bound to restore the price, and to reimburse the expenses
occasioned by the sale, as well as those incurred for the preservation of the
thing, unless the fruits, which the purchaser has drawn from it, be sufficient
to satisfy those expenses."
40. Id. art. 2545 (1870) : "The seller, who knows the vices of the thing he
sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of the price and repayment
of the expenses, is answerable to the buyer in damages."
41. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60
So. 2d 873 (1952); Tuminello v. Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57 So. 2d 666 (1952);
Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, Ltd., 129 La. 838, 56 So. 906 (1911) ; George v.
Shreveport Cotton Oil Co., 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432 (1905).
42. 146 So. 2d 29 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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broke while plaintiff was driving up an incline, causing him
to fall backward and strain his back while struggling to retain
control of the car. He sought damages against the seller of the
automobile. The court refused to award him damages, stating
that there was no showing that the seller knew of the defect,
and that such knowledge could not be imputed to him.
LEASES
An interesting question with respect to renewal of leases
was presented in Woods v. Cities Service Oil Co.43 The lease
contract provided that lessee could extend for an additional
year by giving written registered notice of the intention to do
so to lessor prior to a month before termination. The lease was
due to expire on December 31, 1961. At 5:02 p.m. on November
29 lessee wired lessor notice of renewal. The telegram was
received in Olla, the town of lessor's domicile, at 8:25 the
following morning by the Western Union agent, who at that
time phoned lessor to inform him of the receipt of the telegram,
but was unable to reach anyone at lessor's residence. Shortly
thereafter on the same morning the agent told lessor's son that
he had received a telegram for lessor. The son informed the
agent that lessor was out of town, and instructed the agent to
mail the telegram to lessor, which the agent immediately did.
Lessor testified that he did not receive the telegram from his
post office box in Olla until December 2, 1961, and argued that
notice of renewal was not timely given, since the use of an un-
authorized method of transmission of notice - i.e. telegram -
meant that lessee was at its peril that the notice would not be
timely received by lessor. The court in answering this argument
stated:
"We do not necessarily accede to appellant's argument that
the leased requirement 'written, registered notice' of renewal
was intended to designate registered mail as the exclusive
method of giving notice and to exclude the use of the tele-
graph. Nevertheless, the use of a different method of trans-
mission of the notice of renewal than that contemplated by
the lease does not, if timely received, make the notice defec-
tive, when the substituted method of transmission performs
the same function and serves the same purpose as the au-
thorized method. '44
43. 142 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
44. Id. at 189.
1964]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The court pointed out that if the notice had been given by
registered mail at the same time as it was given by telegram,
it would have been timely and nevertheless would have been
received no earlier than it was under the instant facts. This
case seems a sound application of accepted principles with re-
gard to lease renewal.
Under R.S. 9:3221, subject to certain qualifications, an own-
er-lessor of premises can escape liability to third persons for in-
juries caused by reason of defects in the leased premises by
entering into a contract with the lessee whereby the latter as-
sumes responsibility for the condition of the premises. 45 Several
questions about the proper construction of the statute have
remained unsettled. 46 The question whether a lessee who has
assumed responsibility for the condition of the premises may
escape his liability to persons on the premises by securing an
assumption of liability from a sublessee was involved, but not
specifically dealt with, in the case of Abbott and Barnes Credit
Clothiers, Inc. v. Crane Clothing Co. 47 Defendant, lessee of a
building from the owner, assumed responsibility for the condi-
tion of the premises in the contract of lease. Plaintiff occupied
the lower floor of the building as sublessee. In the contract of
lease from defendant there was also an assumption of responsi-
bility for the condition of the premises. Plaintiff's merchandise
suffered water damage as a result of faulty plumbing in an
upstairs apartment in the building occupied by another sub-
tenant. Plaintiff was held entitled to recovery. The court did
not meet the problem whether defendant might under other
circumstances escape liability by entering into a contract of
assumption with his sublessee, stating that "the 'hold harmless'
clause of the lease under LSA-R.S. 9:3221 cannot avail defend-
ant because defendant, having authorized the installation [of
the faulty plumbing], is charged with responsibility therefor,
required that the work be done by competent plumbers and
the same as though it had contracted therefor. It should have
with municipal approval. '4 8
45. LA. R.S. 9:3221 (1950) :-"The owner of premises leased under a contract
whereby the lessee assumes responsibility for their condition is not liable for
injury caused by any defect therein to the lessee or anyone who derives his right
to be thereon from the lessee, unless the owner knew or should have known of the
defect or had received notice thereof and failed to remedy it within a reasonable
time."
46. See Comment, 20 LA. L. REV. 76 (1959).
47. 141 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
48. Id. at 919.
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